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ALD-245        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1372 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  JULIE P. WHITCHURCH, 
     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the  
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-00431) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 5, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 9, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Julie Whitchurch, proceeding pro se, has filed her second petition for 
writ of mandamus, seeking the recusal of the District Judge presiding over the case.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.  
                                                                    
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Whitchurch was a co-defendant in a civil action brought by her former employer 
Vizant Technologies, LLC (“Vizant”), and its chief executive officer, Joseph Bizzarro, in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before the 
Honorable Harvey Bartle III.  In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, tortious interference with existing and 
prospective contractual relationships, abuse of process, conversion, fraud, and civil 
conspiracy against Whitchurch and Jamie Davis, a fellow former employee of Vizant.  
After extensive litigation, Whitchurch and Davis filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 
seeking the recusal of Judge Bartle.  He denied the motion for recusal.  Whitchurch and 
Davis then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that recusal was warranted 
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) because the District Judge expressed extreme 
prejudice and bias against them and engaged in allegedly improper ex parte 
communications.  We denied that petition, see In re Whitchurch, C.A. No. 16-1005, 2016 
WL 211605 (3d Cir. Jan. 19, 2016) (per curiam), and Whitchurch’s subsequent petition 
for en banc and panel rehearing.     
 While the first mandamus petition was pending before this Court, the District 
Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 
judgment; granted in part and denied in part Whitchurch and Davis’s motion for 
summary judgment; issued a permanent injunction against Whitchurch and Davis; and 
required Whitchurch and Davis to show cause why they should not be held in contempt 
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for a violation of a District Court order.  The District Court then scheduled trial to 
commence on March 2, 2016, on the sole remaining issue of damages.  
 On March 1, 2016, Whitchurch1 filed her second petition for writ of mandamus.2  
Whitchurch once again seeks the recusal of Judge Bartle and incorporates by reference 
the arguments that we already rejected in denying her first mandamus petition in C.A. 
No. 16-1005.3  At the time she filed this petition, the civil case was still pending against 
Whitchurch in the District Court.  However, the record reflects that, subsequent to the 
filing of Whitchurch’s second petition for writ of mandamus, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Whitchurch.  Whitchurch’s appeal of that 
judgment, as well as multiple additional orders of the District Court, is currently pending 
in this Court.  See C.A. No. 16-1178. 
 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 
394, 402 (1976).  Within the discretion of the issuing court, mandamus traditionally may 
be “used . . . only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other 
                                                                    
1 Davis is not a party to the petition.  The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to 
voluntarily dismiss the remaining claims against Davis pursuant to a settlement 
agreement between the plaintiffs and Davis. 
 
2 Included in her petition for a writ of mandamus was a motion to stay a March 1, 2016 
settlement conference; a March 1, 2016 contempt hearing; and the March 2, 2016 trial for 
damages.  We denied the motion to stay in an order entered on February 29, 2016.   
 
3 In this action, she also presents a “notice” for reconsideration of the arguments that she 
raised previously, and she seeks leave to file an exhibit in support of her notice.  
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adequate means exist to attain the relief [s]he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of 
the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the 
circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  A writ of mandamus should not issue where relief 
may be obtained through ordinary appeal.  In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 226 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 We will deny the petition because Whitchurch has not shown a clear and 
indisputable right to relief, and she is not without alternative recourse.  Essentially, 
Whitchurch seeks to challenge the orders against her through claims of fraud on the court 
and alleged improper actions by the District Judge, including demonstrations of purported 
bias and prejudice and ex parte communications.  To the extent she relies on and 
incorporates by reference the arguments made in her first mandamus petition, we reject 
them for the reasons outlined in our opinion denying that petition.  See In re Whitchurch, 
2016 WL 211605, at *1-2. Furthermore, the District Court has entered a final appealable 
order, and Whitchurch is currently appealing 28 orders of the District Court, which 
involve rulings related to discovery, injunctive relief, summary judgment, and damages.  
See C.A. No. 16-1178.  Whitchurch can present her argument for recusal, including her 
claims of fraud on the court, in that action.4  Because her claims can be presented in her 
direct appeal, mandamus relief is not available.  See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212-13 
(3d Cir. 2006).    
                                                                    
4 We express no opinion on the merits of the District Court’s rulings. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.  
Whitchurch’s “motion for leave to file Exhibit B” is granted.      
